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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1988 as part of a comprehensive effort to combat violent
street gang activity,' the California legislature passed an amendment to
section 272 of California's Penal Code,2 commonly known as the Paren-
1. Abramovsky, Parent's Liability for Child's Crime, 202 N.Y.L.J. 3 (1989). The California
legislature found that violent street gangs, whose activities presented a "clear and present danger
to public order," had created a state of crisis. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West Supp. 1990).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1990). In addition, the legislature passed the Califor-
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tal Responsibility Law.3 Section 272 originally stated only that every
person who commits any act or fails to perform any duty that causes or
tends to cause a minor to do a prohibited act is guilty of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, a misdemeanor under the California Penal
Code, and subject to a maximum fine of twenty-five hundred dollars,
one year in jail, or both.4 When the California legislature amended sec-
tion 272, it imposed an additional affirmative duty on parents and legal
guardians "to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and con-
trol over their minor child[ren]."' In essence, California's legislative
package makes parents liable for failing to prevent their minor children
from engaging in criminal activity.
Although the State has not prosecuted anyone under the new laws,7
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU) has
filed a taxpayers' lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Paren-
tal Responsibility Law." The complaint alleges that the amendment is
vague, overbroad, and an infringement on family privacy. The ACLU
has requested that the court enjoin enforcement of the Parental Re-
sponsibility Law and declare it unconstitutional.9
California's Parental Responsibility Law reflects a recent trend
among the states to make parents more responsible for the activities of
nia Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (Street Terrorism Act). Id. §§ 186.20-
186.27. The Street Terrorism Act criminalizes participation in a street gang with knowledge of the
gang's patterns of criminal activity. Id. § 186.22.
3. Law Challenged Holding Parents Criminally Liable, L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1989, at 1, col.
4 [hereinafter Law Challenged].
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988), prior to the 1988 amendment, read: "Every person
who commits any act or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends
to cause or encourage any [minor] ... to come within the provisions of Section 300, 601, or 602 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code" is guilty of a misdemeanor. Sections 300, 601, and 602 define
the types of minors who are subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Section 300 governs minors
who have been or are in danger of being physically, emotionally, or sexually abused or neglected or
exploited'by someone in the minor's home. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1990).
Section 601 covers habitually disobedient or truant minors, id. § 601, and § 602 concerns minors
who have violated any state or federal law or any city or county ordinance other than curfew
ordinances. Id. § 602.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1990). A person is considered a minor in California
until the age of 18. Id.
6. See Kantrowitz, Springen, Annin & Gordon, Now, Parents on Trial, NEwswEEK, Oct. 2,
1989, at 54 [hereinafter Parents on Trial]; Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 3; Law Challenged, supra
note 3, at 1, col. 4.
7. In April 1989 the Los Angeles city attorney filed charges under the Parental Responsibility
Law against Gloria Williams after her son, a gang member, was arrested for rape. Parents on Trial,
supra note 6, at 55. Williams was charged with failing to provide reasonable care for her son. Law
Challenged, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4. Prosecutors dismissed the charges when they learned that
Williams had taken a parenting class. Id.
8. Law Challenged, supra note 3, at 1, col. 4.
9. Id.
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their minor children.10 Some states have imposed certain duties on par-
ents with the ultimate goal of discouraging various forms of undesirable
behavior by their children.11 Moreover, Kentucky1 2 and New York's
have legislation that greatly resembles California's Parental Responsi-
bility Law. This trend has enormous potential for growth because many
states could use existing criminal statutes to regulate parental conduct
in the same manner as California's new legislation. 4
10. Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 3; see also Shapiro, When Parents Pay for Their Kids'
Sins, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 24, 1989, at 26.
City councils also have countered increases in juvenile crimes with ordinances to punish par-
ents who do not keep their children out of trouble. See Gibson, Make Parents Pay for Actions of
Kids, USA Today, Dec. 19, 1989, at 10A (final ed.) (discussing the success of a new city ordinance
in Dermott, Arkansas that seeks to curb juvenile delinquency by prosecuting parents of delinquent
children). For example, the Norwalk, California City Council voted to impose $2500 fines on par-
ents of delinquent children. Harris, Norwalk Votes to Fine Parents of Lawbreakers, L.A. Times,
Feb. 11, 1990, at 1, col. 2 (home ed.). The Norwalk ordinance also enables the city to file civil suits
against parents whose children are gang members. Id.
California State Senator Ed Davis has advocated federal and state tax subsidies to encourage
mothers to stay home and raise children. Davis, A Parental Presence Prevents Delinquency, L.A.
Times, Feb. 25, 1990, at 4, col. 1 (home ed.). According to Senator Davis, mothers should remain at
home to teach children cultural values during the children's formative years. Id.
11. A Florida law requires parents to store securely any loaded guns or face a $500 fine and
60 days in prison. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.173-790.174 (West 1976 & Supp. 1990). In Wisconsin
parents who fail to support the offspring of their unmarried minor children may face a $10,000 fine
or a maximum jail term of two years. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.90 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990). Wisconsin
legislators enacted the law to combat teenage pregnancy and abortion by making parents feel more
responsible for the sexual behavior of their minor children. See Parents on Trial, supra note 6, at
54. Hawaii has a similar law. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 26. The Arkansas legislature has
passed a law that fines parents if their children miss school. Id.
12. "A parent .. . is guilty of endangering the welfare of a minor when he fails or refuses to
exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from becoming a ne-
glected, dependent or delinquent child." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1985). A neglected child is one whose parents have harmed or threatened to harm the child's phys-
ical or emotional welfare. Id. § 600.020(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). A child is dependent if the
child's parents unintentionally cared for the child improperly. Id. § 600.020(15). "Delinquency" is
not defined in the Kentucky Code.
13. "A person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when:... [b]eing a parent, ..
he fails or refuses to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent him from
becoming an 'abused child,' a 'neglected child,' a 'juvenile delinquent' or a 'person in need of su-
pervision,' . . ." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney 1989). An abused child is one whose
parent physically or sexually abused the child or allowed another to abuse the child. A neglected
child is one whose physical, emotional, or mental condition has been impaired or is in danger of
being impaired because the parent has not provided a minimum degree of care. N.Y. JUD. LAW §
1012(e), (f) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). A juvenile delinquent is a child who has committed a
crime. Id. § 301.2(1) (McKinney 1983). A child is in need of supervision if the child is habitually
truant, incorrigible, ungovernable, habitually disobedient, or has a conviction for the unlawful and
knowing possession of marijuana. Id. § 712.
14. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3612, 13-3613 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2
(1990); id. § 16-12-1 (1988); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 201.090, 201.110 (Michie 1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-9-4 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-8-6, 26-9-1 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
In addition, the police in Grand Rapids, Michigan have reactivated a 20-year-old city ordi-
nance that holds parents criminally liable for their children's misbehavior. See Parents Are
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This Note addresses the legal problems presented when states at-
tempt to regulate parental conduct through statutes that penalize con-
tributing to the delinquency of minors.15 Part II of this Note discusses
the current popularity of enforcing contributing statutes to deter juve-
nile crime indirectly. Part III reviews the void for vagueness doctrine
and analyzes the nearly unanimous view of the state courts that con-
tributing statutes are not void for vagueness. Part IV examines the ar-
gument that these statutes violate parents' constitutional right to
privacy in child rearing decisions. Part V concludes that some contrib-
uting statutes are void for vagueness and most contributing statutes im-
permissibly interfere with the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions.
II. BACKGROUND FOR STATUTORY TREND
A. Prevailing Views on the Solution to Juvenile Crime
Between 1978 and 1987 overall arrests of juveniles for violent crime
decreased. 6 In the same period, however, juvenile arrests increased 20
percent for forcible rape and 8.3 percent for aggravated assault. 7 Other
assault arrests also rose, 18 and the number of juveniles arrested for
weapons possession increased 16.9 percent.'
From 1987 to 1988 arrests of juveniles for violent crimes increased
7.7 percent.20 Arrests for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, which
had decreased from 1978 to 1987,21 grew 17.8 percent between 1987 and
1988.22 The previous decline in arrests for drug abuse violations 23 re-
versed sharply from 1987 to 1988.24 Moreover, arrests for aggravated
and other assaults and for weapons possession continued to increase.25
Charged After Crime by Kids, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 6, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Parents Charged].
Although the city had not prosecuted anyone under the ordinance for fifteen years, seven people
have been charged in the last four months. Id. Under the ordinance, parents who fail to exercise
"reasonable control" over their children may face 90 days in jail and a $500 fine. Id. The Assistant
City Attorney has stated that parents will be charged only if their children have committed three
or more serious offenses. Id.
15. This Note does not address the application of contributing statutes to defendants who
are not parents of the minor.
16. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE




20. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR
THE U.S. 176 (1989) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS].
21. SouRcEBooK, supra note 16, at 489.
22. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 20, at 176.
23. SouRcEaoOK, supra note 16, at 489.
24. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 20, at 176.
25. Id.
[Vol. 44:441
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These unsettling patterns of juvenile violence prompted the Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families of the House of Repre-
sentatives to hold a hearing in May 1989 to consider causes of the vio-
lence and possible solutions to the problem.2" Experts on juvenile
delinquency testified that while the proportion of juveniles committing
violent crimes is not increasing,2 7 those juveniles currently involved are
much more violent than deliquents were a few years ago.2" The easy
availability of drugs and weapons has aggravated the situation.2" In ad-
dition, a new phenomenon has surfaced in that inner city men in their
twenties are not growing out of adolescent violence, but instead are con-
tinuing to commit more violent crimes.8 0 Many of the Committee's wit-
nesses pointed to family breakdown as a major contributor to juvenile
delinquency.3' Other witnesses focused on factors such as the influence
of peer groups on juvenile offenders3 2 and poverty. 3 The most common
26. Down These Mean Streets: Violence by and Against America's Children: Hearing
Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989)
[hereinafter Down These Mean Streets].
27. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra note 20, at 172.
28. Down These Mean Streets, supra note 26, at 107 (statement of Dr. Delbert S. Elliott,
Professor of Sociology, University of Colorado at Boulder); see also supra notes 16-25 and accom-
panying text.
29. Down These Mean Streets, supra note 26, at 107.
30. Dr. Elliott explained that violence in young people usually peaks around the ag-of 15 or
16 and ends by the age of 19. Today, almost 20% of delinquent teenagers are continuing their
violent behavior into adulthood. In addition, these delinquent adults are committing violent acts
more frequently. Dr. Elliott suggested that this phenomenon is caused in part by increased poverty
and unemployment in urban areas. Id. at 107-08.
31. Representative Thomas J. Billey, Jr. stated that "[v]iolence on the streets cannot be sep-
arated from what is happening in the home." Id. at 11. Another witness worried about the "deteri-
oration of the family structure." Id. at 44 (statement of J. Reggie B. Walton, Associate Judge,
Superior Court of the District of Columbia); see also id. at 115-16 (statement of Karl Zinsmeister,
Adjunct Research Associate, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
The Department of Justice statistics confirm that family breakdown is a factor in juvenile
delinquency. Almost one-half of the juveniles in long-term institutions were raised by single
mothers. Family breakdown cannot be the entire explanation, however, because almost 30% of
incarcerated juveniles grew up with both parents at home. SouRcEBooK, supra note 16, at 601.
32. Dr. Elliott testified that while inadequate parenting does make juveniles more likely to
be violent, the more immediate cause of juvenile violence is association with violent peer groups.
During adolescence the influence of peer groups far outweighs the influence of parents. Down
These Mean Streets, supra note 26, at 109. Peer groups become the dominant factor perpetuating
violent behavior because these groups teach members "techniques of moral disengagement which
provides justification and rationalizations for engaging in crime." Id. Because violence is an "ex-
pression of group hostility," Dr. Elliott believes that any attempt to solve the juvenile delinquency
problem that ignores peer groups is destined to fail. Id.
33. Parents need more social services before they can reclaim parental authority. "Parents
... can exert power when they are seen as effective protectors; but when their resources ...
prohibit them from providing more than [the barest necessities], then they are seen as weak adult
authority figures. They dare not say no because they fear their children will. . ." leave them. Id.
at 53 (statement of Deborah Meier, Principal of Central Park East Secondary School in East Har-
lem, New York, New York). See generally STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH,
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recommendation made to the Committee was that parents should be
held accountable for the violent activities of their children.3 '
Holding parents responsible for juvenile delinquency is not a new
concept. Colorado enacted the first law holding parents criminally liable
for their children's delinquent acts in 1903 .3 The reasoning behind the
concept is fairly simple. The family is the primary influence in the lives
-of children and, therefore, is the institution best situated to prepare
children to become productive members of society.36 Consequently, the
state should require parents not only to provide for the basic needs of
children, but also to teach them fundamental societal values, including
respect for authority.3 7 Advocates of this solution suggest that lack of
adequate parental control and guidance causes juvenile delinquency.
Advocates also believe that through the imposition of fines or prison
terms for delinquent parenting the state can force parents to control
their children and, therefore, decrease the incidence of juvenile
delinquency. 8
B. The Hidden Potential in Present Criminal Laws for Expansion
of the Trend
Many states are embracing this proposed solution to the growing
problem of juvenile crime. For example, California prosecutors lob-
AND FAMiUEs, 100TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON CHILDREN AND FAMLuEs: KEY TRENDS IN THE 1980s
3 (Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter REPORT ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES] (outlining the economic
problems facing the modern family).
34. See, e.g., Down These Mean Streets, supra note 26, at 165 (response by Judge Walton to
subsequent questions posed by Congressman Lamar Smith); id. at 119 (statement of Karl Zin-
smeister, Adjunct Research Associate, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
Zinsmeister recommended positive family building laws, new penalties for persons who harm chil-
dren, and new laws holding parents accountable for the actions of their children. "[T]he first step
in reducing juvenile delinquency has to be to make negligent parents, who are just kind of not
exerting themselves in a proper way, exert some control over their charges." Id.
35. For a discussion of the Colorado law, see Gladstone, The Legal Responsibility of Parents
for Juvenile Delinquency in New York State: A Developmental History, 21 BR0oLY L. REv. 172,
173-74 (1955). "This theory of [parental] criminal responsibility and causation [of juvenile crime]
climbs upwards in popularity every now and then. When it has its effect we have increased punish-
ment.., of parents of delinquent children." S. RUBIN, CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENcY 21 (3d
rev. ed. 1970).
36. See Children and Families in Poverty: Beyond the Statistics: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1985) [hereinafter Chil-
dren and Families] (additional submitted material by Glenn C. Loury); S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS
FAIL: THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 1, 2 (1971).
37. S. KATZ, supra note 36, at 9-13.
38. See generally Children and Families, supra note 36, at 64 (discussing the role of the
family in juvenile delinquency). But see S. RUBIN, supra note 35, at 21-31 (calling for the repeal of
contributing statutes); Alexander, What's This About Punishing Parents?, 12 FED. PROBATION 23
(1948) (acknowledging the failure of Ohio's contributing statute).
39. See Parents on Trial, supra note 6, at 54; Shapiro, supra note 10, at 26.
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bied for the adoption of the Parental Responsibility Law because they
believed that it would divide children and gangs.4 ° Most states already
can force parents to take greater responsibility for their children
through enforcement of statutes that prohibit contributing to the delin-
quency of minors.41 Many.contributing statutes contain general terms
that could be used to punish parents for either acts or omissions later
found to have promoted the delinquency of their children. A typical
statute reads: "Contributing to [the] delinquency of [a] minor consists
of any person committing any act, or omitting the performance of any
duty, which act or omission causes, or tends to cause or encourage the
delinquency . . ." of a minor.42 This language is broad enough to in-
clude any activity of a parent, intentional or not, that an outside ob-
server subsequently determines is detrimental to the child.
Other state contributing statutes contain language specifically ap-
plicable to parental behavior. Contributing statutes in California, New
York, and Kentucky explicitly require parents to exercise reasonable
control over their children.43 Other states either bury the control provi-
sions in the statutory definitions of delinquent or dependent children44
or require parents to prevent their children from engaging in certain
40. Prosecutors stated that the new law would "drive a wedge between children and gangs."
Law Challenged, supra note 3, at 22, col. 2.
41. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.130 (1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3613 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-27-205, 5-27-220 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp.
1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-701 (1988 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (West
1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1102 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-1 (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. §§
709-904 (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2361a (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-8 (Burns 1985);
IO1AA CODE ANN. § 233.1 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608 (1989); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92 (West 1986); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 554 (1983 & Supp. 1989); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-831 (1989);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 63 (West Supp. 1990); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 750.145 (West
1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.315 (West Supp. 1991); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (Supp. 1990);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-709 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.110 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 169-B:41 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-3
(1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-10-06 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.24 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 858.1 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.575 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4304
(Purdon Supp. 1990); RIL GEN. LAWS § 11-9-4 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-490 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-9-1 (Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-156 (1984); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 72.002 (Vernon 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-371 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.42.030 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 49-7-7 (Supp.
1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 948.40 (West Supp. 1990).
42. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-3 (1984).
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060(1) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1985); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(2) (McKinney 1989).
44. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3613, 13-3612 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-12-1, 15-
11-2 (1988, 1990); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.110 (Michie 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-9-
1, 26-8-6 (Supp. 1990).
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behavior.45
Although in the past states generally have used contributing stat-
utes to punish strangers for sexual or physical assaults on minors, 46 the
statutory language permits a broader application. New York, for exam-
ple, which previously has applied its contributing statute narrowly, soon
may use its statute to police parental behavior.47 Because New York
and California are influential states, other states are likely to follow
their lead. The majority of states would not require legislative action to
punish parents; instead, state prosecutors simply could begin to enforce
existing criminal statutes more strictly.
8
III. THE VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
A. Supreme Court Decisions
Defendants have challenged contributing statutes most frequently
under the void for vagueness doctrine.49 The United States Supreme
Court developed the doctrine in a series of cases in which the Court
held that a penal statute violates due process ° if its terms are too
vague and indefinite."' The purpose of the void for vagueness doctrine
is to ensure fair warning of the effect of a penal statute and to prevent
standardless law enforcement.2
If a statute's terms are too vague, ordinary citizens, forced to guess
at the statute's meaning, inevitably will disagree about what conduct
comes within the purview of the statute." More importantly, a vague
law allows policemen, judges, and juries to make subjective, and possi-
45. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.24 (Anderson 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-4
(1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974).
46. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 comment, at 445-47 (1980).
47. Abramovsky, supra note 1, at 3.
48. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 comment (discussing broad reach of current
contributing statutes); S. RusIN, supra note 35, at 28 (stating that "[a]s long as 'contributing'
statutes are on the books, the danger exists that they will be used, and when they are used, the
danger exists ... that they will be abused"); see also Parents Charged supra note 14, at 3 (dis-
cussing the current enforcement of a little-used city ordinance holding parents criminally liable for
their children's misbehavior).
49. See, e.g., Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913
(1959); State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 542 A.2d 686 (1988); State v. Bachelder, 565 A.2d 96 (Me.
1989); State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 155 N.W.2d 788 (1968); State v. Flinn, 158 W. Va. 111, 208
S.E.2d 538 (1974).
50. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
51. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156 (1972); United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963); United States v.
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). For a good discussion of Supreme Court decisions in this area, see Flinn,
158 W. Va. at 111, 208 S.E.2d at 538.
52. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
53. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
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bly arbitrary, decisions.54 Thus, the principal requirement of the vague-
ness doctrine is that criminal statutes establish at least minimal
guidelines to limit discretionary law enforcement.5
The Constitution, however, does not require complete specificity.5 6
At times the legislature must use general terms in a statute because the
various behaviors required or prohibited cannot be described or listed
adequately.5 7 An ambiguous statute is not unconstitutional merely be-
cause of the possibility that in some marginal cases the exact applica-
tion of the statute will be difficult to determine.5 Moreover, courts may
cure the constitutional shortcomings of potentially vague statutes by
finding a specific intent element in the offense59 or by determining that
prior judicial decisions have eliminated the vagueness.60
In accordance with concerns for both discriminatory enforcement
and due process, the Supreme Court has adopted two approaches to the
vagueness problem, depending on whether the Constitution protects the
activity governed by the statute. In Thornhill v. Alabama6 ' the Court
held that the Constitution requires a strict vagueness test when review-
ing statutes that regulate first amendment rights.6 2 The strict test re-
quires a facial examination of an allegedly vague statute
notwithstanding the particular conduct concerned in the case. The
Thornhill Court believed that the freedoms of speech and of the press
deserved enhanced protection because of the importance of these rights
in a democracy. 4 The Court was concerned that vagueness in statutes
54. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98. The subjective nature of vague statutes encourages harsh
and discriminatory law enforcement. Id.
55. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
56. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7-8.
57. One court has upheld a contributing statute on this basis, stating that the ways in which
an adult may corrupt a minor are so numerous that "to compel a complete enumeration in any
statute designed for protection of the young before giving it validity would be to confess the inabil-
ity of modem society to cope with the problem of juvenile delinquency." State v. McKinley, 53
N.M. 106, 111, 202 P.2d 964, 967 (1949).
58. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7.
59. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952).
60. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
61. 310 U.S. at 88.
62. See id. at 96-98. In Thornhill the defendant was charged with violating an Alabama stat-
ute that prohibited persons from loitering or picketing, without just cause, on the property of a
lawful business, with the intention of convincing customers not to trade with that business. Id. at
91. The defendant had been picketing the Brown Wood Preserving Company under a strike order
issued by the American Federation of Labor. Id. at 94. According to the Court, the Alabama stat-
ute embraced almost every available means of informing the public about the causes of a labor
dispute. Id. at 104. The Court stated that "freedom of speech and of the press ... embraces at the
least the liberty to discuss publicly ... all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment." Id. at 101-02 (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 96-97; see State v. Hodges, 254 Or. 21, 26, 457 P.2d 491, 493 (1969).
64. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95.
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regulating first amendment rights would deter constitutionally pro-
tected and socially desirable conduct.15 Additionally, the Court feared
that a vague statute would prove to be a convenient tool for harsh and
discriminatory enforcement against disfavored groups.6
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville17 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the strict test of Thornhill beyond first amendment rights to
other constitutionally protected activities. Papachristou concerned a
challenge to a Florida vagrancy ordinance that criminalized normally
innocent activities, such as wandering without lawful purpose or objec-
tive and becoming economically dependent on a wife or minor child
even though able to work."' The Court stated that although the Consti-
tution and Bill of Rights do not list these particular activities specifi-
cally, these activities historically have been features of life in the
United States." Tolerance for this conduct has fostered American inde-
pendence and creativity by inviting spirited dissent and nonconformity
rather than submissiveness."0 The Court consequently held that the or-
dinance was unconstitutional under Thornhill because the broad lan-
guage of the ordinance allowed the police and the courts to violate the
constitutionally protected right of citizens to determine their personal
lifestyles.7'
The Papachristou decision was not based on the first amendment
or on any specifically enumerated constitutional right. The Court was
concerned more about arbitrary enforcement of the vagrancy statute
based on subjective statutory criteria and the potential that law en-
forcement officials could apply the statute inappropriately to deter so-
cially desirable, historically protected conduct. This extension of
Thornhill is not limited to vagrancy statutes, even though the
Papachristou Court did mention the distinctive and familiar abuses of
65. United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963).
66. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98.
67. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
68. Id. at 156 n.1.
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. The Court stated:
The difficulty [with the ordinance] is that these activities are historically part of the ameni-
ties of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill
of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the
feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have
dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right
to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffo-
cating silence.
Id.
71. Id. at 170. The Court stated that persons covered by the statutory language could be
"required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville
police and the courts." Id.
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vagrancy statutes by law enforcement officials. 72 In later cases the Su-
preme Court has stated explicitly that the Thornhill test applies to con-
stitutionally protected activities other than first amendment liberties.73
In United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.74 the Court de-
veloped a second, less exacting approach to the vagueness problem. The
Court held that it would examine general penal statutes that do not
implicate constitutionally protected activities both facially and in light
of the particular conduct concerned in the case.75 Thus, if the statute as
applied would not violate the due process rights of the defendant, the
Court will allow it to stand even if it might be unconstitutionally vague
in another situation.76 The Court usually tests economic regulatory stat-
utes under this looser standard because of the narrower subject matter
and because businesses are expected to plan their activities more care-
fully than individuals.77 In these cases the Court has found the terms of
statutes to be sufficiently certain by interpreting the statutes in light of
the common understanding and general usage of the words.78
B. Analysis of State Court Decisions on the Vagueness of
Contributing Statutes
State courts almost unanimously have rejected challenges to con-
tributing statutes based on vagueness;7 9 however, the rationale of the
various courts has differed.80 Some courts have looked to the legislative
72. The Court was worried that "a vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a con-
viction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest." Id. at 169.
The Court quoted with approval Justice Felix Frankfurter's statement that "[t]hese [vagrancy]
statutes are in a class by themselves, in view of the familiar abuses to which they are put ....
Definiteness is designedly avoided.. . to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in
the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense." Id. (quot-
ing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
73. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
74. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
75. Id. at 36. National Dairy concerned violations of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13a (1988), which prohibits selling goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying
competition." 372 U.S. at 29. The Court distinguished Thornhill on the ground that Thornhill
concerned first amendment activities, which are constitutionally protected and socially desirable.
Id. at 36. The Robinson-Patman Act, on the other hand, is "directed only at conduct designed to
destroy competition," activity that is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. Id.
76. National Dairy, 372 U.S. at 33.
77. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982); see United
States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
78. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1971); Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 5-8.
79. See, e.g., Brockmueller v. State, 86 Ariz. 82, 340 P.2d 992 (1959); State v. Bachelder, 565
A.2d 96 (Me. 1989); State v. McKinley, 53 N.M. 106, 202 P.2d 964 (1949); State v. Crary, 10 Ohio
Op. 2d 36 (Common Pleas Ct. 1959); Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276
(Super. Ct. 1957); State v. Flinn, 158 W. Va. 111, 208 S.E.2d 538 (1974). None of these cases
concerns the type of parental conduct at issue in this Note.
80. See generally Flinn, 158 W. Va. at 116, 208 S.E.2d at 547-48 (discussing various state
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intent behind the statute and narrowed the scope of the statute to de-
mand only the conduct that would best achieve the legislative pur-
81pose. Other courts have rejected vagueness objections because the
statute so obviously prohibited the particular conduct concerned.
82
Many courts have upheld contributing statutes on the broad policy
ground that the welfare of youth is such a vital state interest that the
legislature must write statutes in general terms that preserve the flexi-
bility necessary to handle the problem of juvenile delinquency effec-
tively.8 Other courts have found contributing statutes constitutional
because these statutes have a long history at common law84 or because a
lack of prior challenges to the law indicates that no genuine vagueness
problem exists. 5 One group of state courts upheld the statutes on the
grounds that the terms were not indefinite.86
court decisions).
81. See, e.g., State v. Simants, 182 Neb. 491, 493, 155 N.W.2d 788, 790 (1968); Crary, 10 Ohio
Op. 2d at 39; Flinn, 158 W. Va. at 137, 208 S.E.2d at 552-53.
82. See, e.g., Bachelder, 565 A.2d at 97 (stating that "it cannot be doubted in this instance
that the children's natural mother, with whom they live, has... a duty... [that] extends to
caring for their health, safety and mental welfare"); People v. Owens, 13 Mich. App. 469, 477, 164
N.W.2d 712, 714-15 (1968) (finding that encouraging a 16-year-old girl to leave home was exactly
the type of conduct that the statute intended to prohibit); Matthews v. State, 240 Miss. 189, 193,
126 So. 2d 245, 246 (1961) (holding that defendant's failure to provide proper medical treatment
for her child "indicated at least a negligent and careless attitude toward the care and well-being of
her child"); James v. State, 635 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the language of
the statute was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable person that encouraging and aiding a 14-
year-old to dance nude in a public bar contributed to her delinquency).
83. See, e.g., People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (1953); McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); State v. Cialkowski, 193 Neb. 372, 227
N.W.2d 406 (1975); McKinley, 53 N.M. at 106, 202 P.2d at 964; State v. Coterel, 97 Ohio App. 48,
123 N.E.2d 438 (1953), appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio St. 112, 120 N.E.2d 590 (1954); Birdsell v.
State, 205 Tenn. 631, 330 S.W.2d 1 (1959); State v. Harris, 105 W. Va. 165, 141 S.E. 637 (1928).
84. See, e.g., Brockmueller, 86 Ariz. at 84, 340 P.2d at 994 (stating that a long history of
common-law interpretation renders the language of these statutes sufficiently clear and
meaningful).
85. See, e.g., State v. Friedlander, 250 P. 453, 455 (Wash. 1926) (noting that no one previ-
ously had challenged the 1907 statute as unconstitutionally vague and that the objection had no
merit).
86. See Randall, 183 Pa. Super. at 611, 133 A.2d at 279-81. In State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C.
499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), the court held that because the words used in the statute were ordinary
words of common usage, the statute gave adequate warning that "any person who knowingly does
any act to produce, promote or contribute to any condition of delinquency of a child is in violation
of the statute." Id. at 509, 173 S.E.2d at 903.
After rejecting the defendant's void for vagueness challenge to Utah's contributing statute on
grounds of waiver, the Utah Supreme Court stated in dicta in State v. Tritt, 23 Utah 2d 365, 463
P.2d 806 (1970), that the terms "delinquency" and "contributing to delinquency" in the statute
have such widespread usage that the statute had a clear and understandable meaning. Id. at 369,
463 P.2d at 808-09. The court found that these terms denoted any actions that caused a child to
engage in conduct which "is contrary to law or which is so contrary to the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality" that the result of this conduct would harm substantially the
child's "mental, moral, or physical well-being." Id. at 369, 463 P.2d at 809. But see State v. Val-
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A few courts, however, have found contributing statutes void for
vagueness."1 Most recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a
statute prohibiting any "act likely to impair the health or morals" of a
child" was unconstitutionally vague as applied to a particular set of
facts. 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court similarly struck down a statute
penalizing an adult for enticing, aiding, or permitting a minor to per-
form an "immoral act."90 In Oregon, the state supreme court found that
the statutory language, "any person who does any act which manifestly
tends to cause any child to become [a delinquent]," was void because it
contained no standards by which a jury could determine guilt.9 1 More-
over, the Wyoming Supreme Court struck down a statute prohibiting an
adult from causing, encouraging, aiding, or contributing to the endan-
germent of a minor's health, welfare, or morals.2 The court stated that
determining what conduct was being prohibited based on the terms of
the statute would be an utter impossibility.9
Very few of the state courts that have upheld contributing statutes
lery, 212 La. 1095, 1098-99, 34 So. 2d 329, 331 (1948) (rejecting a similar definition of "immoral").
87. See, e.g., State v. Schriver, 207 Conn. 456, 561-62, 542 A.2d 686, 689 (1988); Vallery, 212
La. at 1099, 34 So. 2d at 331; State v. Hodges, 254 Or. 21, 27-28, 457 P.2d 491, 494 (1969); State v.
Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967, 968-69 (Wyo. 1963).
88. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (West 1985).
89. Schriver, 207 Conn. at 456, 542 A.2d at 686. In Schriver the State of Connecticut charged
the defendant with engaging in activity that was "likely to impair the health or morals" of a child.
The court found that the statute, on its face, failed "to articulate a definite standard for determin-
ing whether the conduct [of this defendant was] permitted or prohibited." Id. at 461, 542 A.2d at
689. The court then discussed whether prior judicial decisions had added a gloss that could save
the statute. The court concluded, based on prior decisions, that "grabbing the waist of a fully
clothed minor while uttering a sexually suggestive remark is not the type of lewd conduct that §
53-21 proscribes." Id. at 466, 542 A.2d at 691.
90. Vallery, 212 La. at 1095, 34 So. 2d at 329. The Louisiana court determined that the term
"immoral" was too vague to establish any standards for enforcement. The court rejected a statu-
tory construction that defined "immoral" as conduct that violated "well established and well ac-
cepted standards of the community" because that definition was equally uncertain. Id. at 1098-99,
34 So. 2d at 331.
After Vallery the Louisiana legislature amended the statute to read "sexually immoral act."
State v. Fulmer, 250 La. 29, 31, 193 So. 2d 774, 774 (1967). The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
the new statute on the grounds that "sexually immoral" had an "accepted meaning not susceptible
to misunderstanding." Id. at 33, 193 So. 2d at 775.
91. Hodges, 254 Or. at 21, 457 P.2d at 491. The Hodges court held that the statute was void
for vagueness because it was an "instrument of potential abuse" contrary to due process and be-
cause it violated the Oregon Constitution's prohibition on the delegation of legislative power. Id. at
28, 457 P.2d at 494. While some courts have interpreted Hodges as based solely on the state consti-
tution, the decision also is based on the due process clause of the federal constitution. See Flinn,
158 W. Va. at 128-29, 208 S.E.2d at 548. But see Comment, Contributing Survives Constitutional
Attack: Confusion or Certainty, 78 W. VA. L. Rzv. 145, 149-50 (1975).
92. Gallegos, 384 P.2d at 967. Although the Gallegos court cited Supreme Court cases to
support its discussion, the court ultimately based its holding on the Wyoming Constitution. Id. at
969.
93. Id. at 968.
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have provided defensible reasoning for their decisions. The judicial de-
cisions that avoided the constitutional question through statutory con-
struction" effectively eliminated vagueness concerns. Courts frequently
can construe statutes to avoid constitutional challenges.9 5 On the other
hand, state courts that have declared a potentially vague statute consti-
tutional on grounds that no one had challenged it before96 cannot de-
fend this reasoning. In addition, a blanket assertion that protecting
children is a vital state interest 97 circumvents the question of whether
the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Other state courts have yet to analyze their contributing statutes in
light of the Supreme Court decisions on vagueness. While the egregious-
ness of a defendant's conduct98 may be relevant to the court's determi-
nation, the court first must decide which constitutional test applies
before evaluating the weight of the facts. The facts of a case are irrele-
vant under the Thornhill test because the court must judge the poten-
tial for vagueness problems on the face of the statute, while under the
National Dairy approach, the court also must consider the statute in
light of the facts.
The state court decisions holding that the language of the contrib-
uting statutes was not indefinite9 require closer examination. In Mus-
ser v. Utah'00 the United States Supreme Court stated that a statute
prohibiting a person from committing any act "injurious to public
morals" was vulnerable to multiple subjective interpretations by judges
and jurors depending on the fact finder's view of morality.'" The Court
did not strike down the statute, but hinted that unless the Utah Su-
preme Court construed the statute to supply more definite standards,
the statute would be void for vagueness. 0 2 The Musser decision sug-
gests that the contributing statutes phrased in terms of morality are
facially vague.
94. See Brockmueller, 86 Ariz. at 84, 340 P.2d at 994 (interpreting statute in light of a long
history of common law); State v. Crary, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 36, 39 (Common Pleas Ct. 1959) (limiting
statute's application to certain specified types of conduct).
95. See Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); State v. McKinley, 53 N.M. 106, 111,
202 P.2d 964, 967 (1949); James v. State, 635 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Flinn,
158 W. Va. 111, 130, 208 S.E.2d 538, 547 (1974).
96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
100. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
101. Id. at 96-97; see also Flinn, 158 W. Va. at 130, 208 S.E.2d at 549 (stating that the
phrases "immoral or vicious persons" and "injure or endanger the morals" are unconstitutionally
vague).
102. See Musser, 333 U.S. at 96-98.
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In Commonwealth v. Randall,03 however, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court upheld a statute that penalized adults whose actions cor-
rupted or tended to corrupt the morals of a child. According to the
court, the statute was not vague because the community easily could
decide what particular conduct was forbidden based on commonly ac-
cepted notions of decency, morality, and common sense.104 Although
both Randall and Musser concerned interpretation of the term
"morals," the Pennsylvania court apparently found the clear and obvi-
ous meaning that had eluded the Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania
court distinguished Musser on the grounds that public morals was a
much broader category than the morals of children. 05 Yet the court
failed to explain how the term "morals" as applied to children could
have an obvious, universal meaning when other courts have declared
the term unconstitutionally vague. 06
Other state courts have upheld contributing statutes because the
terms "delinquency" and "contributing to delinquency" have clear
meanings. 10 7 Because "delinquency" was not known at common law,
however, all definitions of the terms are statutory. 8 Since nearly every
state defines "delinquency" differently, 0 9 the term must lack a clear
and obvious meaning. Moreover, when the courts considering these
statutes attempted to define "delinquency," they based their definitions
in terms of "morality."" 0 As illustrated by the admonition of the Su-
preme Court in Musser, the term "morality" is unconstitutionally
vague."'
C. Application of the Void for Vagueness Doctrine to Contributing
Statutes
Under modern void for vagueness doctrine, a court first must de-
cide whether to apply the strict Thornhill test or the less exacting Na-
tional Dairy standard. If the contributing statute infringes on
constitutionally protected conduct, the court should apply the stricter
Thornhill test. Under either test, however, contributing statutes that
103. 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276 (Super. Ct. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958).
104. Randall, 193 Pa. Super. at 611, 133 A.2d at 280.
105. Id. at 610, 133 A.2d at 278.
106. See State v. Vallery, 34 So. 2d 329 (La. 1948); Flinn, 158 W. Va. at 111, 208 S.E.2d at
538.
107. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
108. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 comment, at 444-45 (1980).
109. For a sampling of the various definitions, see OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A CoMPARATIvE ANALysxs OF JUVENILE CODES 23-24
(1980).
110. See cases cited supra note 86.
111. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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contain a specific intent element 1 2 pass constitutional muster. The con-
tributing statutes pertinent to this Note"3 fall roughly into one or both
of two categories, neither of which specify a requisite intent. These cat-
egories include: (1) statutes, like California's Parental Responsibility
Law, that require parents to exercise reasonable or proper control over
their children" 4 and (2) statutes that require persons to prevent minors
from engaging in certain conduct." 5
The concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in Papachris-
tou" 6 are present in the context of contributing statutes that expressly
require parents to exercise reasonable or proper control. Although par-
ents have a limited duty in civil law to control the conduct of their
children,"' contributing statutes broaden parental liability because the
statutes, unlike the civil law, may be used to impose criminal penalties
on parents who neither know nor have reason to know the consequences
of their conduct in relation to their children. Yet courts long have rec-
ognized parental discretion in child rearing as a fundamental precept in
112. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-13 (1988) ("willfully"); ARa STAT. ANN. § 5-27-205, 5-27-220
(1987) ("knowingly"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1102 (1987) ("knowingly" or "intentionally"); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-12-1 (1988) ("knowingly and willfully"); HAW. REv. STAT. § 709-904 (1988) ("know-
ingly"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2361a (1987) ("knowingly or willfully"); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
46-1-8 (Burns 1985) ("knowingly or intentionally"); IowA CODE ANN. § 233.1 (West 1985 & Supp.
1989) ("knowingly"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 92 (West 1986) ("intentional"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 554 (1983 & Supp. 1989) ("knowingly"); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-831 (1989)
("willfully"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-39 (Supp. 1989) ("willfully"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:41
(Supp. 1988) ("knowingly"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1986) ("knowingly or willfully"); N.).
CENT. CODE § 14-10-06 (Supp. 1989) ("willfully"); OF- REV. STAT. § 163.575 (1985) ("knowingly");
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304 (Purdon 1989) ("knowingly"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-490 (Law. Co-
op. 1985) ("knowingly and willfully"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (1989) ("willfully"); WAsH. RFV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.42.030 (1988) ("recklessly").
113. This Note focuses solely on the statutory language. If the state judiciary has provided a
limiting interpretation of these statutes, the statutes might not be void for vagueness. See Musser
v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) (remanding case to state supreme court for authoritative interpretation
of statute in vagueness case).
114. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §- 13-3612 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp.
1990); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 530.060 (Baldwin 1985); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.090 (Michie 1986);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1989); Si). CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-9-1 (1989).
115. The statutes in this category hold parents liable for behavior that tends to cause their
children to engage in certain conduct such as growing up to lead an "idle, dissolute or immoral
life," ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3612 (1989), habitually associating with "vicious, immoral, or
criminal persons," R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-9-4 (1981), or acting in a way likely to "injure or endanger
the health or morals of himself or others," OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Anderson 1987). See
also NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201.090 (Michie 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974).
116. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
117. Under civil law a parent has a "duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor
child" to prevent the child from intentionally or recklessly harming others if the parent "knows or
has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and ... knows or should know of




our society, 118 premising the fundamental character of parental rights
on the idea that the democratic system mandates individualized and
independent parental decisions free of official interference."" The free-
dom of parents to choose how to raise their children is even more basic
to our society than the freedom to wander and to enjoy a variety of
lifestyles that was protected in Papachristou. By requiring parents to
exercise reasonable or proper control over their children, contributing
statutes in the first category attempt to regulate sensitive constitutional
rights without any concrete guidelines to limit the subjective discretion
of prosecutors, policemen, judges, and jurors. Thus, based on the rea-
soning in Papachristou, a court should apply the stricter Thornhill test
to this category and judge the statutes facially. 20
A statute requiring parents to exercise reasonable or proper control
over their children may not appear unconstitutionally vague because
the Constitution does not require complete specificity.' 2 ' The Court,
however, usually allows general language in a statute only if greater
specificity is either impossible or impractical. 12 2 In the parental control
context, the legislature could identify what type of parental behavior
would be penalized. 2 - In addition, even though courts and legislatures
typically define legal standards in terms of reasonableness, 24 the risk of
arbitrary law enforcement in the application of this standard is sub-
stantial when regulating parental control. 25 Without a concrete defini-
tion of what constitutes "reasonable" or "proper" parental control,
prosecutors, judges, and jurors are free to make hindsight judgments
about parental conduct based on their personal views of "reasonable" or
"proper" behavior. No consensus exists concerning the proper or rea-
sonable way to raise children, and the judiciary has no special compe-
tence in this area. 28 Unless prior judicial decisions have provided a
118. See infra subpart IV(B)(1).
119. See infra subpart IV(B)(2).
120. See State v. Hodges, 254 Or. 21, 26, 457 P.2d 491, 493 (1969) (stating that the "Thorn-
hill rule is not invoked . . . unless the terms of the questioned statute are so broad that their
application in a normal, nondiscriminatory way would violate the individual's constitutional
rights").
121. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
122. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983); see Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7-8.
123. For example, the legislature could add a specific intent requirement and specify what
type of behavior parents should discourage. While states regularly set minimum standards for the
care, supervision, and protection of children, these statutes are much more specific than the con-
tributing statutes. See S. KATz, supra note 36, at 10-12.
124. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (stating that "the law is full of
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently
estimates it, some matter of degree").
125. See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
67, 93 (1960).
126. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion). Moreover, the Court
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concrete definition of proper or reasonable conduct, these statutes are
unconstitutionally vague.
One commentator has found that the Supreme Court has used the
vagueness doctrine to create an insulating zone of protection around
certain freedoms in the Bill of Rights." Once a legislature attempts to
regulate a constitutionally protected area, the Supreme Court's re-
sponse will depend on a variety of factors including the nature of the
threatened individual freedom and the potential deterrent effect of the
risks of arbitrary enforcement.12 Parental discretion in child rearing is
an important right in our society, and this intrusion ifito family life
could be extremely detrimental to the family unit.129 These factors fur-
ther suggest that contributing statutes requiring parents to exercise rea-
sonable or proper control over their children are unconstitutionally
vague.
The second category of contributing statutes requires persons to
prevent minors from engaging in certain conduct. Although the statutes
in this category may contain vague terms, they do not implicate paren-
tal discretion in child rearing expressly. These statutes should be
judged under the National Dairy test because they contain only the
potential for use against parents. If used against parents, these statutes
would fail even the looser test of National Dairy because they contain
morality language that is unconstitutionally vague.
In Rhode Island, for example, a parent could be held criminally
liable for "permit[ting] or suffer[ing]" a child to "habitually associate
with vicious, immoral, or criminal persons, or to grow up in ignorance,
idleness or crime."'130 On its face, the Rhode Island statute contains in-
herently subjective criteria for punishment. While the term "permit"
does have some element of specific intent, parents may disagree over
whether particular persons are immoral. Other statutes in this category
contain similar questionable language. 13' As illustrated by the Supreme
Court in Musser v. Utah,32 the term "morality" is unconstitutionally
vague.
Even though the provisions concerning morality may be vague
facially, these statutes also must be judged in light of the particular
stated that one central premise has emerged in this area: parents must have a substantial measure
of authority over their children. Id.; see also L.A. Times, June 21, 1989, at 7, col. 5 (home ed.)
(emphasizing the lack of definition in California's Parental Responsibility Law).
127. See Note, supra note 125, at 75.
128. Id. at 94.
129. See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
130. R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-9-4 (1981).
131. Most of the statutes in this second category prohibit some form of "immoral" conduct.
See supra note 115.
132. 333 U.S. 95 (1948); see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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conduct at issue. Under the National Dairy test, if the behavior at issue
in a particular case is so extreme that everyone generally could agree
that it is immoral, a court probably would uphold the statute despite its
facial vagueness. In addition, a court always could turn to prior judicial
decisions to see if precedent had added a judicial gloss that would limit
the application of the statute. A court also might declare statutes in
this second category unconstitutionally vague if prosecutors, judges, or
jurors used their own subjective views of correct parental behavior to
penalize nonconforming parents.
IV. VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FAMILY MATTERS
A. Substantive Due Process Methodology
While defendants have challenged contributing statutes as uncon-
stitutionally vague rather than as violations of a constitutional right to
privacy in family matters, 13 3 this latter constitutional objection may
have a greater chance of success. The Supreme Court repeatedly has
held that the state and federal governments cannot deprive citizens of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.13 4 The due process
clause provides both procedural'3 5 and substantive"3 6 protections. While
in most cases a court will uphold a statute unless it lacks any rational
basis,137 if the statute infringes on a fundamental right, the governmen-
tal interest behind the statute must be compelling and the means must
be closely related to the end. 3 8 If parental rights are not fundamental,
a court will uphold the constitutionality of contributing statutes be-
cause under the rational basis test, a court will approve almost any rea-
son for the statute."' If parents have a fundamental right to privacy in
child rearing, however, a court will subject the contributing statutes to
strict scrutiny.
Much of the litigation related to substantive due process has con-
133. Defendants probably have not raised the family privacy defense because most of the
defendants convicted for violating contributing statutes were either strangers to the minor or rela-
tives accused of sexually molesting the minor. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.4 comment 1, at 447
(1980).
134. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
135. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). This Note does not examine procedural due
process protections.
136. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
137. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
138. Once a court finds a fundamental right the statute must pass strict scrutiny. See Roe,
410 U.S. at 113.
139. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483, 488.
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cerned the definition of "fundamental right."'40 For a forty year period,
beginning with Lochner v. New ,York,! 4' the Supreme Court substituted
its views of social and economic values for those of the state and federal
legislatures under the guise of substantive due process. 142 Since the end
of the Lochner era the Court has been wary of imposing its own value
judgments in place of the legislative will;1 3 however, the Court consis-
tently has continued to look beyond the text of the Constitution to de-
termine which substantive rights the due process clause protects."
4
According to the Court, fundamental rights are those rights that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," 45 or "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.""' 14 Recently, the Court has stated that
the due process clause only protects those interests that society tradi-
tionally has protected.1
47
B. Parental Rights As Fundamental Rights
1. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court first addressed family rights in Meyer v. Ne-
braska14' and Pierce v. Society of Sisters."49 Both Meyer and Pierce
concerned state statutes that interfered with parents' ability to choose
how to educate their children.5 0 In Meyer the Court stated that al-
140. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); Roe, 410 U.S. at 113; Griswold,
381 U.S. at 479. See generally Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93
HAsv. L. REV. 1156, 1168-77 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing other aspects of sub-
stantive due process); McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental
Rights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975, 980-84 (1988) (briefly outlining the controversies surrounding the Su-
preme Court's use of substantive due process).
141. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
142. Developments, supra note 140, at 1166-67.
143. "The Judiciary... is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
... the design of the Constitution." Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting).
144. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 113 (concerning childbearing); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (concerning marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (concerning sterilization).
145. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
146. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (various
Justices attempted to define fundamental rights).
147. Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2333. While the traditional rationale was not followed in older
cases such as Roe, 410 U.S. at 113, tradition does seem to be an important consideration to the
current Supreme Court. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy traditionally has not been protected in our society).
148. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
149. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
150. In Meyer a Nebraska statute prohibited any person from teaching another language or a
subject in any language other than English to a child who had not passed the eighth grade. 262
U.S. at 397. In Pierce an Oregon statute required parents to send their children between the ages
of eight and sixteen to public schools. 268 U.S. at 530-31.
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though it could not define the liberty protected by the due process
clause exactly, that liberty undoubtedly included the right to marry and
raise children. 151 Likewise the Court held in Pierce that the due process
clause prevented the state from requiring all children to attend public
schools because parents have the right and the duty to raise their chil-
dren individually.
1 52
While the Court purportedly applied strict scrutiny in these cases,
the statutes ultimately failed because the legislation did not have a rea-
sonable relationship to a permissible purpose. 153 Thus, these statutes
arguably would have failed the looser rational basis test as well as the
strict scrutiny test. Meyer and Pierce may not stand directly for the
proposition that parental rights are fundamental 154 because of the nar-
rowness of the holding and the timing of the decisions.1
55
The Court reaffirmed these early family rights cases in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.1'6 The Yoder Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute
requiring children to attend school until the age of sixteen because the
statute impermissibly infringed on the fundamental right of parents to
raise their children. 5 7 In that case Amish parents had refused to send
their children to school after the eighth grade because of the parents'
religious beliefs.' 58 Although the Court found no flaw in the statutory
purpose, the Court decided that application of the statute in this case
would not further the statutory purpose.' 5 The Court clearly empha-
sized the importance of the parental right to raise children free from
state interference,' yet the Court also focused on the freedom of reli-
gion claim.' 6 ' Therefore, some commentators believe that Yoder may
151. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
152. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
153. Id. at 534-35 (stating that "the Act. . . unreasonably interferes with the liberty of par-
ents. . to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer, 262 U.S.
at 403 (holding that "the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end
within the competency of the State").
154. See McCarthy, supra note 140, at 986-89 (suggesting that Meyer and Pierce are of lim-
ited significance in the family rights area).
155. Because the Court decided both Meyer and Pierce during the Lochner era, the Court's
expansive view of substantive due process during that time could have tainted the Court's reason-
ing. See id. at 993; Rose, Compulsory Education and Parent Rights: A Judicial Framework of
Analysis, 30 B.C.L. R-v. 861, 876-79 (1989).
156. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
157. Id. at 214.
158. Id. at 208-09.
159. Id. at 234-36.
160. Id. at 213-14, 232-34.
161. The Yoder Court stated that "when the interests of parenthood are combined with a
free exercise claim ... more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the compe-
tency of the State' is required to sustain the validity" of the statute. Id. at 233.
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162have limited significance as a family rights case.
The Court extended the reasoning of Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland.63 In Moore a plurality of the Court
applied strict scrutiny to a housing ordinance that limited the occu-
pancy of a home to certain defined members of a family.' 6' Although
the ordinance had legitimate goals, the means used did not achieve
those goals adequately.6 5 Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the plural-
ity, acknowledged that Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder had not dealt ex-
pressly with the problem raised in Moore,"6 but he explained that the
due process clause protects the family rights implicated in those three
cases because the rights are rooted in the Nation's traditions and his-
tory."'67 Justice Powell believed that tradition and history also com-
pelled the Court to strike down the housing ordinance. 68 A plurality of
the Court held that the due process clause prevented the state from
forcing its citizens to live in particular family patterns.6 9
Although the Court has considered directly the parental right to
raise children only in rare cases, it has continued to recognize the fun-
damental nature of parental rights in a variety of other situations. In
these cases the Court has asserted broadly that precedent plainly estab-
lishes that parents' interest in raising their children deserves deference
unless the state can show a powerful countervailing interest. 70 The
Court has discussed the fundamental nature of parental rights in the
context of state proceedings to terminate parental rights,' 7 ' in cases
concerning the rights of unwed fathers17 and foster families, 73 and in
162. See McCarthy, supra note 140, at 990-91; Rose, supra note 155, at 880.
163. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality decision).
164. Id. at 496 & nn.1-2 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 499-500 (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 500-01 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 503-04 (plurality opinion).
168. Id. at 500-01, 506 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell stated that "unless we close our
eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter
under the . . .Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these
precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at 501 (plurality opinion).
169. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell, analogizing the Cleveland ordinance to the
statute in Pierce, which sought to "standardize" children by requiring them to attend public
schools, stated that "[b]y the same token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standard-
izing its children.., by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns." Id.
170. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (stating that
previous cases have "made plain beyond the need for multiple citation" that the parental right
deserves deference "absent a powerful countervailing interest").
171. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (acknowledging "this Court's histori-
cal recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest"); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
172. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342 (1989) (noting the "historic
respect" for family relationships); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) (stating that "the
relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to consti-
462 [Vol. 44:441
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privacy cases concerning other family matters.17" The Court also has
upheld parents' authority over their children in light of challenges to
that authority by the child. 17 1 Several lower federal courts explicitly
have recognized a fundamental right to family integrity based on these
Supreme Court cases. 16
2. Justification for Protecting Parental Decisions
Even though the Court often speaks of the fundamental nature of
parental rights, its opinions rarely offer a justification for this protec-
tion. An understanding of why the family has been protected histori-
cally may bolster the argument that the family rights at issue in the
contributing statutes deserve constitutional protection. In a recent case,
the Court explained that the fundamental character of family rights
stems from the historic respect for the sanctity of familial
relationships.177
tutional protection"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (stating that the Court has
"recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitution-
ally protected"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
173. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
842-47 (1977).
174. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965).
175. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 626 (1979) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 602-04 (1979).
176. See, e.g., Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985 (6th Cir.) (challenging the summary removal poli-
cies and practices of the state welfare department), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1033 (1983); Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458 U.S. 502 (1982)
(challenging a state adoption act); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977) (concerning
an action for damages stemming from the conduct of the city child welfare bureau); Doe v. Con-
necticut Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 712 F. Supp. 277 (D. Conn. 1989) (discussing an action
for damages caused by state child welfare officials); McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp.
1381 (D.N.H. 1984) (attacking the "facial validity of juvenile curfew ordinance"); Sylvander v. New
England Home for Little Wanderers, 444 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass.), af'd, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir.
1978) (challenging the constitutionality of a parental rights termination statute); Roe v. Connecti-
cut, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (attacking a state child neglect law); Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd in part, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976) (challenging a
state parental rights termination statute); see also Developments, supra note 140, at 1237-38 (dis-
cussing the effect of more widespread judicial recognition of the fundamental rights of parents).
177. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341-46. Although only two members of the Court fully
endorsed the plurality opinion's view of the proper way to weigh tradition in the substantive due
process analysis, the Court unanimously agreed that family rights traditionally have warranted
protection. Id.; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Moore, 431 U.S. at 494 (plurality
opinion).
One commentator has suggested that the Supreme Court always uses tradition as a basis for
recognizing fundamental rights for families. See Developments, supra note 140, at 1177. The Court
first attempts to determine whether the interest at issue has been regarded historically as within a
sphere in which the state's interference is disfavored. Id. at 1178. Even if the interest has been
protected historically, the interest also must have contemporary validity. Id. at 1179. After the
Court decides which characteristics of the interest are of constitutional importance, it must define
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A plurality of the Court discussed its deference to parental rights
more comprehensively in Bellotti v. Baird,17 18 a case challenging the
constitutionality of a statute requiring parental consent before a minor
could obtain an abortion. "9 The Bellotti Court explained that the state
should defer to parents in child raising matters because of the impor-
tant role parents play in the child's development. 80 This role is essen-
tial to the creation of socially responsible citizens and largely beyond
the competence of a large impersonal institution.'' By entrusting child
care to parents, the state fosters social pluralism and diversity, impor-
tant ideals in a society that is committed to individual liberties. 82
Therefore, according to the Bellotti Court, parental authority is a basic
presupposition of a free society.183
Commentators have agreed with the Bellotti Court's reasons for
protecting parental judgments and have advanced additional justifica-
tions. One commentator has argued that by insulating the rights of par-
ents to control the upbringing of their children, the state serves the
interests of the parents, the child, and society. 84 Parents obviously
have an interest in raising their children free from interference.8 5 This
parental control usually serves the interest of the child as well because
parents can fulfill a child's needs in ways that an institution cannot.
18 6
Finally, parental control may help to preserve an individualistic society
by precluding state attempts at standardization.187 Parental rights may
deserve different degrees of protection depending on which of the iden-
tified interests are present.'
Other commentators rationalize the protection given parental deci-
sions through generalized analogies to the Bill of Rights. 8 9 Through
these rights, the Constitution makes a statement about the form of gov-
ernment and society in the United States. The Constitution protects
certain individual rights in part to guarantee the freedom of citizens to
make certain personal decisions unfettered by conventional norms. 190
Under this theory, parental autonomy in child rearing decisions flows
the scope of that interest based on those characteristics. Id. at 1180.
178. 443 U.S. at 622.
179. Id. at 624.
180. Id. at 637-38.
181. Id. at 638.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Developments, supra note 140, at 1353.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1214, 1353-54.
187. Id. at 1215-16, 1354.
188. Id. at 1354.
189. McCarthy, supra note 140, at 1026-28.
190. Id. at 1026.
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directly from the individual right to decide to have children.' 91
C. The State's Compelling Interest
Even assuming that the parental right to raise children is funda-
mental,192 the Constitution does not preclude the state from limiting
that right. The state can interfere with a fundamental right only if the
state has a compelling interest and the means chosen are closely related
to that interest.19 3 The state's compelling interest for contributing stat-
utes is the protection of society from the wrongful acts of children, not
the protection of children from the wrongful acts of parents.
The state's power to intervene in the family setting stems from two
sources: the police power and the parens patriae power. 94 Under either
of these powers, the state has a limited right to intervene in family af-
fairs if the family situation evidences a threat to either the community
or the welfare of the child. The state uses its police power to protect
and promote all aspects of public welfare. Clearly, the state has the
power to prevent and punish acts that directly threaten the existence or
stability of the state or the personal safety or security of its citizens.
Thus, California can defend its Parental Responsibility Law, and other
states their contributing statutes, based on the state's need to protect
society from the wrongful acts of children. 95 Under its parens patriae
power, the state can protect and promote the welfare of only those indi-
viduals, such as minors, who lack the capacity to act in their own best
interests. 19s
The Supreme Court has ruled that the states may circumscribe pa-
rental discretion. 197 In Prince v. Massachusetts,98 for example, the
Court upheld the conviction of a guardian for allowing her wards to sell
191. Id. at 1027. A joint commission of the Institute of Judicial Administration (IJA) and the
American Bar Association (ABA) also has argued that state intervention in family decisions should
be limited because of our society's commitment to individual freedom and diversity. STANDARDS
RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT Standard 1.1, commentary at 49-50 (IJA-ABA Joint Comm'n on
Juvenile Justice Standards 1981) [hereinafter IJA-ABA STANDARDS]. Extensive intervention carries
the risk of intervening to "save" the children of poor or minority parents. Id. at 49.
192. See Rose, supra note 155, at 874-83 (discussing the fundamental nature of parents'
rights to educate their children).
193. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
194. Developments, supra note 140, at 1198-1202.
195. For a discussion of the Parental Responsibility Law, see supra notes 1-7 and accompa-
nying text.
196. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
197. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Parham Court noted that a state constitu-
tionally can control parental discretion in situations in which the physical or mental health of a
child is jeopardized. Id. at 603.
198. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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religious leaflets in violation of child labor laws.' 9 The defendant
claimed that the conviction violated both her freedom of religion 200 and
her parental rights.2"' The Court balanced the substantial private inter-
ests of parents against the societal interest in protecting the welfare of
children.202 The Court recognized that under both Meyer and Pierce a
private sphere of family life exists in which the state cannot interfere.20 3
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the power of the state to limit the rights
and duties of parents under its parens patriae power when the child's
welfare was at stake20 4 because of the state's independent interest in
the welfare of children within its borders.20 5 Although the Court upheld
the statute, it cautioned that the holding was limited to the facts of the
case.
206
In later cases the Court has explained that parental rights are ac-
companied by duties.0 7 The right of parents to educate their children
that was recognized in Meyer and Pierce is coupled with the duty to
prepare the child for a responsible place in society. 20 8 Indeed, the con-
stitutional protection afforded family decisions is based on the pre-
sumption that parents will act in the best interests of their children.20 9
When parents act contrary to that presumption, the state may inter-
vene to protect the child.2'0 In addition, Justice Byron White has ar-
gued that although parents have a fundamental right to make decisions
about child rearing, some activities by parents, such as assaults on their
children, are intrinsically outside the scope of the parents' fundamental
rights.2 "
While the Court has recognized the power of the state to interfere
with parental discretion, usually the state's compelling interest in the
welfare of the child justifies the interference. 2 2 The purpose of Califor-
nia's Parental Responsibility Law and similar statutes, however, is to
199. Id.
200. Id. at 164 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
201. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend XIV).
202. Id. at 165.
203. Id. at 166.
204. Id. at 166-67.
205. Id. at 168-69; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
206. Prince, 321 U.S. at 171.
207. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
208. Id. at 257-58.
209. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
210. Id.
211. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2
(1986) (White, J., dissenting); see also McCarthy, supra note 140, at 1027-28 (discussing Justice
White's view).
212. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Parham, 442 U.S. at 584.
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protect society from the wrongful acts of the child, not to protect the
child. 13 Thus, these statutes are not justified based on the child's wel-
fare. Protecting society from the wrongful acts of children is the only
legitimate purpose for these statutes.
D. The Statutory Method Does Not Closely Fit the Goal
The Supreme Court has allowed the state to restrict parental dis-
cretion when necessary to protect the child's welfare only because the
means closely fit that end.214 Yet the state's only compelling interest in
contributing statutes that regulate parental conduct is protecting soci-
ety from juvenile crime. Thus, the question for a court is whether polic-
ing parental behavior is closely related to that goal.
Commentators long have argued that criminalizing parental behav-
ior does not reduce juvenile crime.21 While state officials readily have
assumed that these statutes actually reduce delinquency rates, the only
empirical study in this area revealed that these sanctions simply do not
achieve the desired results.21 s In 1948 Judge Paul Alexander analyzed
the effects of punishing parents under Toledo, Ohio's contributing stat-
ute over a period from 1937 to 1946.21 When parents prosecuted under
the statute received a suspended sentence, the conduct of those particu-
lar parents improved.21 8 Despite massive publicity of ninety-one cases
that resulted in actual punishment of the parents, however, the number
of parents arrested increased steadily over the ten-year period.21 9 Judge
Alexander found no evidence that punishing parents had any effect on
curbing juvenile delinquency. 220 Although delinquency rates remained
213. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes behind the
California statute.
214. Even in this area, the state cannot interfere freely in family life. The Constitution does
not permit the state to disrupt families in general simply because some parents abuse or neglect
their children. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. The Parham Court stated that the "notion that govern-
mental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and
neglect children is repugnant to American tradition." Id. The state must show that intervention in
a particular case will further its goal of protecting children. See Santoshy, 455 U.S. at 745. Parents
do not lose their fundamental rights because they have not been model parents. Id. at 753. The
Court has recognized that parents who are threatened with state intervention need even more
constitutional protection than model parents do. Id.
215. See, e.g., S. RUBIN, supra note 35, at 21-31; Ludwig, Delinquent Parents and the Crimi-
nal Law, 5 VAND. L. REV. 719 (1952); Note, Criminal Liability of Parents for Failure to Control
Their Children, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 332 (1972).
216. Alexander, supra note 38, at 23.
217. Id. Judge Alexander reviewed 1027 contributing cases, 500 of which involved parents as
defendants.
218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 28-29.




steady during the first three years of the study, the rates increased
sharply in 1943 and subsequently declined.22' Regardless of this empiri-
cal evidence, state officials continue to believe that these statutes can
reduce delinquency. This belief, however, faces broad opposition.
Contributing statutes do not reduce juvenile crime effectively be-
cause the statutes address only one aspect of the problem of juvenile
delinquency, lack of parental control.22 Although inadequate and irre-
sponsible parenting is a factor behind delinquent behavior, other fac-
tors, such as social class, educational level, urbanization, living
conditions, and social instability, are equally important.2 ' Dr. James
Austin, director of research at the National Council on Crime and De-
linquency, testified before a congressional subcommittee that experts
have linked juvenile delinquency to combinations of factors such as
-drug abuse, school failure, inadequate family relationships, antisocial
values, child abuse, and association with delinquent peers.224 The most
important predictive factor of delinquent behavior is association with a
delinquent peer group. 25 Because parental behavior may be one of
many influences in the life of a delinquent child, determining whether
the parental behavior at issue in a particular case actually caused the
delinquency would be almost impossible.228 Some states have avoided
this causation problem by also criminalizing parental behavior that
221. Alexander, supra note 38, at 23.
222. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text; see also Nazario, What Do We Know
About Delinquency?, 12 UPDATE ON LAW-RELATED EDUC. 8, 8 (1988) (stating that experts cannot
agree on a single cause of delinquency).
223. See Note, supra note 215, at 334; see also Nazario, supra note 222, at 8.
224. Youth and the Justice System: Can We Intervene Earlier? Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 89 (1984) (statement of
James Austin, Director of Research, National Council on Crime and Delinquency). Mr. Austin
reported several trends among juveniles: (1) rates of delinquency for serious juvenile offenders
generally decrease over time; (2) rates of emotional problems for youth generally decrease over
time; (3) rates of drug abuse generally increase over time; (4) serious delinquents have high rates of
multiple drug use, emotional problems, school problems, and family problems; (5) serious delin-
quents are principally male and are associated strongly with delinquent peer groups; (6) associa-
tion with delinquent peer groups is the most important predictor of serious delinquent behavior.
Id. at 92-93.
225. Id.
226. See Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, The Use of Prediction Data in Understanding De-
linquency, 6 BEHAVIORAL SC. & L. 333 (1988). The authors surveyed the research done in the area
of prediction of juvenile delinquency. They concluded that many factors, including early childhood
behavior, family situation, socioeconomic status, and peer groups, may predict later delinquent
behavior, but cautioned against excessive reliance on any particular factor. Id. at 345. The authors
believe that the "processes that lead to delinquency are still poorly understood." Id. The authors
stated that "the fact that a particular factor predicts delinquency does not mean necessarily that
such a factor is causal to delinquency." Id. Because many predictive factors are interrelated, a
particular factor may predict delinquency "solely by virtue of its association with another, more
causally related factor." Id.; see also Note, supra note 215, at 339-44 (discussing the legal require-
ments for criminal omissions and the causation problems associated with contributing statutes).
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tends to cause delinquency regardless of whether the child actually be-
comes delinquent.
Not only does punishing parents not reduce delinquency, but appli-
cation of contributing statutes adversely affects the family unit.22 s In
general, the fines under these statutes are too small to effect a change
in the behavior of the parents,229 but often reduce the already minimal
resources available for parents to provide for the family.2 30 Prison
sentences can be even more detrimental for the entire family.231 Remov-
ing the parent from the home may eliminate the one stable factor in the
delinquent child's life and also may leave other children without any
parental care.232 Many commentators believe that these parents need
society's help, not its punishment. 23 3 Delinquent children are frequently
from lower economic levels. 34 Parents of these children often are una-
ble to meet the mental, emotional, and social needs of their children
because of a lack of resources, not a lack of will.2 3 5 Punishing parents
only exacerbates the problems that cause delinquency. Criminal sanc-
227. See, e.g., ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3614 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-1 (1988).
228. See Hafen, The Family As an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 865, 909-15 (1989).
229. Most fines for violating contributing statutes are approximately $1000. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 80.05 (McKinney 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-6-2 (Supp. 1990). The maxi-
mum statutory fines, however, vary from $100 to $10,000. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West
Supp. 1990) (imposing maximum $2500 fine); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15 (Supp. 1990) (imposing
maximum $5000 fine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1974) (imposing maximum $100 fine); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 939.50 (West 1982) (imposing maximum $10,000 fine).
230. See Ludwig, supra note 215, at 733. See generally REPORT ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
supra note 33, at 1-14 (outlining the economic problems in today's families).
231. In the majority of states, violation of the contributing statute could result in one year in
jail. See, e.g., ARE. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-4-401(b)(1), 5-27-205 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-663 (1988).
In the other states, prison terms could range from 30 days to 18 months to 10 years. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-21 (West 1985) (imposing 10 year term); IOWA CODE ANN. § 903.1 (West
Supp. 1990) (imposing 30 day term); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15 (Supp. 1990) (imposing 18 month
term).
232. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 191, Standard 9.1 commentary (arguing that im-
prisonment of a parent is against the child's psychological interest).
233. See S. RUBIN, supra note 35, at 24-25; Ludwig, supra note 215, at 731-36; see also Rip-
ston, No Parent Is Safe from Headline Justice, L.A. Times, June 21, 1989, at 7, col. 5.
234. See Children and Families, supra note 36, at 64.
235. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Ripston, supra note 233, at 7. A
famous New York case illustrates this proposition. See Humann v. Rivera, 272 A.D. 352, 71
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1947). A mother was arrested for being "indifferent and irresponsible" and for "fail-
ing in her responsibility" as a parent after her 14-year-old son shot three strangers with a stolen
gun. The trial judge sentenced the mother to one year in jail under New York's contributing stat-
ute. Public interest groups became involved in the case on appeal and discovered that the mother
had been mistreated by her own parents, abandoned by her husband and forced to raise two chil-
dren alone, and was afflicted by mental and emotional problems. The appellate court reversed the
conviction because of the admission of hearsay evidence and ordered a new trial if the authorities
deemed necessary. For a discussion of this New York case, see S. RUBIN, supra note 35, at 24, and
Ludwig, supra note 215, at 719-20. Because this mother did not encourage the delinquency of her
son intentionally, criminal sanctions would have had no effect in this case.
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tions simply may be ineffective in this setting.236
In addition, contributing statutes may be both overinclusive and
underinclusive. By punishing parents for failing to exercise reasonable
care for or control over their children, the state will punish some par-
ents merely because their child is delinquent, even though the parents
tried, but were unable, to control their children's behavior. Alterna-
tively, some parents who do fail to control their children will escape
punishment simply because their children did not become delinquent.
Because these statutes do not contain a specific intent element, the only
difference between these two sets of parents is that one set has a delin-
quent child. Even though some states do not require an adjudication of
the child's delinquency before application of the contributing statute,
237
in practical terms the authorities rarely will discover inadequate paren-
tal control without some delinquent act by the child. Because of this
detection problem, application of contributing statutes actually occurs
too late to prevent delinquency.
238
Finally, the use of contributing statutes against parents is an ex-
tremely intrusive method of achieving the state's goal. Contributing
statutes are inherently ambiguous and difficult to apply because of their
broad language. Judges and jurors must determine whether a parent
used reasonable control over a child. Even though reasonableness is a
common standard in criminal statutes, it is an inherently subjective in-
quiry. s9 Parents constantly will have to decide how a disinterested ob-
server would judge a particular behavior. This area is too sensitive and
subjective to allow outsiders to make these determinations. The Su-
preme Court has stated that no societal consensus on the correct way to
raise children exists and that the judiciary has no special expertise in
the matter.240 In addition, the American Bar Association has recom-
mended that because no best way to raise a child exists, states should
limit themselves to protecting children from specific harms.
24 1
Contributing statutes may have served a purpose when they were
236. See Ludwig, supra note 215, at 732-34 (arguing that criminal sanctions cannot deter
unintentional parental misbehavior effectively and could have adverse consequences even if paren-
tal behavior is intentional); see also Comment, BRI v. Leonard: The Role of the Courts in Preserv-
ing Family Integrity, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 185 (1988) (arguing that the state should protect the
family and encourage independent family decisions through the courts).
237. See supra note 227 and accompanying 'text.
238. Ludwig, supra note 215, at 732.
239. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 191, at 49; S. KATZ, supra note 36, at 5 (stating
that state laws describing the legal responsibilities of parents for their children are "expressions of
community expectations about parenthood" and their interpretations "reflect prevailing middle-
class mores").
240. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion).
241. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, supra note 191, at 50.
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first enacted, 2  but they are an anachronism in criminal law today. The
Model Penal Code has substituted a more limited endangerment provi-
sion for its contributing statute largely because of the criticisms leveled
against contributing statutes. 43 States have other more narrowly tai-
lored statutes to penalize parents who intentionally harm their children
or truly neglect them.244 By relying on application of contributing stat-
utes to reduce juvenile crime, state legislatures are avoiding the tough
issues surrounding the failure of the juvenile justice system.245
While the state may have a compelling interest in preventing juve-
nile delinquency, no evidence suggests that policing parental behavior
achieves that end. Contributing statutes unnecessarily infringe on par-
ents' fundamental right to raise their children free from undue state
interference. These statutes are difficult to apply and have detrimental
effects on families. The statutes as applied to parents should fail the
strict scrutiny test because the means do not closely fit the end.
V. CONCLUSION
When states use contributing statutes to force parents to control
their children, these statutes are vague and an impermissible infringe-
ment on the fundamental rights of parents. The statutes that require
parents to exercise reasonable or proper control over their children are
unconstitutionally vague because they lack even minimal guidelines to
limit the discretion of law enforcement officials.2 46 Although some par-
ents will fail to fulfill the responsibilities that accompany the right to
raise their children, the state can reach those parents through properly
limited statutes that contain specific intent elements and concrete defi-
nitions of delinquency. A parent who knowingly, willfully, or intention-
242. Contributing statutes may have functioned at one time in the same manner as modern
child abuse and neglect statutes.
243. MODEL PzNAL CODE § 230.4 comment, at 444-52 (1980). The drafters of the Model Penal
Code were concerned that the "range of behavior punishable as contributing to delinquency was as
broad as the whole penal code and more." Id. at 446. The drafters advocated precise purposes for
criminal laws. Id. at 449. According to the drafters, these broad contributing statutes are "mean-
ingless criminological concept[s]" and are simply a way for legislatures to avoid hard decisions in
this area. Id. at 450. Model Penal Code § 230.4 "is designed to state the appropriate limits of the
function that the criminal law should perform." Id. That section requires knowing action by the
parent and actual endangerment of the child before liability may attach. Id. at 450-52.
244. Id. at 450.
245. See Ripston, supra note 233, at 7. For a discussion of some of the problems of the
juvenile justice system, see Kaufman, The Child in Trouble: The Long and Difficult Road to Re-
forming the Crazy-Quilt Juvenile Justice System, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 743 (1982); Note, Un-
governability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YAL.E L.J. 1383 (1974); Middleton, Punishment
or Parenting for Child Criminals?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
246. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text; see also Ripston, supra note 233, at 7
(discussing the arbitrariness of California's Parental Responsibility Law).
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ally encourages a child to commit a violent criminal act should be
punished. The generalized contributing statutes, which are not ad-
dressed specifically to parents, may be constitutional in some situations
depending on the facts of the case, but these statutes also contain in-
herently subjective moral standards.247 In addition, while inadequate
parental control has been linked to juvenile delinquency, this linkage is
too speculative to justify the extensive infringement on the fundamen-
tal rights of parents.248 The state cannot interfere in the family setting
because of the mere possibility that interference will solve the juvenile
crime problem.
Violent juvenile crime is a problem in modern society.249 Although
state governments have the right to remedy the problem, the state can-
not achieve that goal at the expense of the constitutional rights of par-
ents. State governments should avoid the lure of this easy response to
juvenile crime. The causes of juvenile delinquency remain unclear.2 50
Even if inadequate parenting is a factor, the strong arm of the criminal
law is not appropriate in the family context. The same reasons that jus-
tify deferring to parental decisions in the typical family situation apply
with equal strength when the American family is breaking down.2 1' In-
stead of penalizing parents for their failures, state officials should focus
on solving the multitude of problems that face parents in the 1990s
such as the lack of affordable housing, education, and health and child
care. 252 Maybe if parents could provide better opportunities for their
children, the children would be less inclined to commit violent acts.2 5
Kathryn J. Parsley
247. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
248. See supra subpart IV(D).
249. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 31-33 and 222-27 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 177-91 and accompanying text.
252. See REPORT ON CHILDREN AND FAmILms, supra note 33, at 1-50.
253. See supra note 33. Many states have implemented programs designed to help potential
juvenile delinquents. See Natali, Orange County Focus: Buena Park, L.A. Times, June 19, 1990, at
3, col. 2 (Orange County ed.) (discussing program in which police attempt to reach potential gang
members and offer family counseling); Rich, Preschool Care Linked to Drop in Delinquency,
Wash. Post, at All (final ed.) (discussing experimental program in Syracuse, New York); Sipchen,
Kids Out of Control, L.A. Times, May 18, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (home ed.) (advocating "family preser-
vation" projects); Thomas, Pulling Teens Back from the Edge, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1988, at Ji
(final ed.) (describing Washington, D.C. Youth at Risk Program).
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